Abstract.

In the research new approaches to modeling of processes of acceptance of strategic decisions with use of theoretical-game toolkit which are based on possible increase in outcomes at simultaneous reduction of the risk connected with them (on Savage) are considered and allow to construct the guaranteed decisions and risks and to investigate features of balance on Berge. In order to identify the features of the Berger equilibrium, in particular, stability and nonperfection, the article formalizes the Pareto-Guaranteed Berge solution and proves the theorem of the existence of such a solution in mixed strategies, as well as its properties. The article presents the results of structural analysis of interaction and mutual influence of economic, legal and social macro-systems and offers theoretical and game models that contribute to the implementation of constitutionally established norms, the requirements of which define Russia as a social state. Thus, when making strategic decisions in the social sphere, the concept of the Golden rule of morality is proposed as the main economic doctrine, instead of the currently used neoliberal approach, based on the concept of equilibrium on Nash.

Keywords:

macrosystem, Berge equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, uncertainty, risk, social guarantees, population

PP. 28-41.

DOI: 10.14357/20790279190303

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